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INNOVATION IN THE WIRELESS ECOSYSTEM: 
A CUSTOMER-CENTRIC FRAMEWORK 
Gerald R. Faulhaber* 
David J. Farber† 
Introduction 
The Federal Communications Commission’s Notice of Inquiry in GN 09-157 Fostering 
Innovation and Investment in the Wireless Communications Market is a significant event at an 
opportune moment.  Wireless communications has already radically changed the way not only 
Americans but people the world over communicate with each other and access and share 
information, and there appears no end in sight to this fundamental shift in communication 
markets.  Although the wireless communications phenomenon is global, the US has played 
and will continue to play a major role in the shaping of this market.  At the start of a new US 
Administration and important changes in the FCC, it is most appropriate that this proceeding 
be launched. 
The title of the proceeding has been chosen wisely.  Innovation and Investment are two sides 
of the same coin; new ideas, new technologies and new business methods cannot happen 
without investment, and neither investment nor innovation will happen without incentives for 
innovators and investors to perform their roles.  The focus on market is also a wise choice; 
some might view wireless as a technology, or perhaps a social phenomenon, and of course it is 
all of these.  But it is the market which brings all of this to fruition and certainly it is the market 
that determines what innovations and investments customers really want.  Of course, this is 
not enough; key resources such as spectrum must be readily available in order for markets to 
play their role in eliciting innovation and investment. 
Some analysts and pundits have suggested that the market for wireless communications is 
flawed, controlled by a few large firms that suppress new technologies and limit the market.1  
They call for FCC intervention to fix these flaws via regulation, and many of the issues raised 
by these analysts and pundits are raised in the NOI.  But good policy requires that 
intervention in markets must be based on empirical evidence of market failures and the 
likelihood of a proposed remedy’s efficacy in correcting that failure.  Unless interventions are 
based on rigorous analysis of market failure and the efficacy of the remedy, the most likely 
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outcome is increased cost, reduced customer choice, reduced incentives to invest and reduced 
incentives to innovate.2   
In earlier work, Faulhaber (2009) argued that FCC policy must be customer-centric; ensuring 
that key decisions about products and services should be made by customers in the 
competitive marketplace , not regulators, legislators, pundits, self-styled advocates, lobbyists 
or even academics.  The job of the FCC is not to make decisions about “approved” business 
models but rather to ensure that customers are able to make such choices in markets which are 
competitive, innovative and transparent.  The customer must be at the center of decision-
making; it is the job of the FCC to make that happen.  We take the same perspective in this 
paper. 
In this paper, we review the wireless industry’s past performance in three dimensions: (i) the 
rate of innovation; (ii) how competitive the industry is; and (iii) how competitive wireless 
innovation is.  We do so by examining the record of three key layers in the industry’s vertical 
chain: software applications, devices (handhelds), and the core wireless distribution networks.  
We find it useful to compare and contrast the wireless ecosystem (including Internet access) 
with the personal computer/Internet ecosystem, both in terms of innovation and in terms of 
market structure.  
To preview our results: we find that the three segments of the wireless marketplace 
(applications, devices, and core network) have exhibited very substantial innovation and 
investment since its inception.  Perhaps more interesting, innovation in each segment is highly 
dependent upon innovation in the other segments.  For example, new applications depend 
upon both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in spectral efficiency of the 
core network to provide the network capacity to serve those applications.  Further, we find 
that the three segments of the industry are also highly competitive.  There are many players in 
each segment, each of which aggressively seeks out customers through new technology and 
new business methods.  The results of this competition are manifest: (i) firms are driven to 
innovate and invest in order to win in the competitive marketplace; (ii) new business models 
have emerged that give customers more choice; and (iii) firms have opened new areas such as 
wireless broadband and laptop wireless in order to expand their strategic options. 
Having found that all three segments are highly competitive, we ask, where is the market 
failure?  If none, then the principle of customer-centric applies:  let customers make the key 
decisions regarding which products, services, open vs. managed business models, net 
neutrality, et al. will survive in the marketplace.  While there is no shortage of pundits, 
advocates, lobbyists and academics advising the FCC that it, rather than customers, should be 
making these decisions and advising the FCC what those decisions should be, a customer-
centric FCC must leave these decisions to customers in a competitive marketplace.  Should the 
FCC decide to preempt customers and make choices for them, it follows as does night from 
day that the result will be (i) less customer choice, and therefore reduced customer well-being; 
(ii) higher costs for producers and therefore customers; (iii) lower incentives to invest and -3- 
 
innovate, harming customers, producers and the American economy.  In this case, economics 
and technology are on the same page: economists advise intervention only in the case of 
demonstrated market failure, and then only if there is evidence that the intervention will do 
more good than harm.  The technologist’s advice is more pithy and down to earth: if it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it!  
We then consider potential problems raised in the NOI as possible targets for FCC 
intervention.  The subsequent sections of the paper explore whether or not there are market 
failures in wireless communications, and, if so, what appropriate interventions might be.  We 
are mindful, and ask that the FCC be mindful, of the potential negative effects of well-meaning 
interventions that are unsupported by hard evidence.   
We explicitly ask if there is a proactive role for the FCC in fostering innovation and find that 
indeed there is.  In fact, the FCC can and must play a crucial role in making available much 
more licensed spectrum for use in wireless communications.  Only if sufficient spectrum is 
made available will innovators and investors have the critical input they need to keep up the 
rate of innovation the industry has so far exhibited. 
Specifically, we address issues in the NOI regarding whether  the FCC should  
  mandate spectrum sharing of licensed spectrum, with the view of encouraging “non-
interfering” uses such as cognitive radio.3 
  adopt network infrastructure policies that foster the deployment of 4G and future 
technologies for wireless broadband, as well as explore alternatives to traditional 
network architectures, such as mesh networks. 
o  Adopt alternative dispute resolution processes for resolving interference 
disputes 
  consider “openness” regulation, so that all applications can run on all compatible 
devices. 
o  We focus on the network neutrality regulations proposed recently by Chairman 
Genachowski 
  consider how different business platforms and different business models affect 
innovation. 
Lastly, we raise an issue not addressed in the NOI, and that is transparency.  In the body of the 
paper, we make the consistent argument that competition in all segments of the industry has 
driven innovation and can continue to do so.  But it will only do so if customers understand 
what they are buying and can make informed and intelligent purchase decisions.  This 
requires all producers (application providers, device makers and core network providers) to be 
transparent in their dealings with customers concerning all matters that are relevant to -4- 
 
customers’ purchase decisions.  Part and parcel of a customer-centric policy must be ensuring 
the transparency of all wireless markets, a charge that government must take very seriously. 
To preview our conclusions, we find all wireless segments to be demonstrably innovative, 
with competition driving this innovation.  We find there is no market failure which would 
necessitate market intervention by the FCC.  Indeed, we strongly support a customer-centric 
policy: put the customer at the center of decision-making. Let the customer, rather than 
regulators, legislators, pundits, advocate or academics, decide among open or managed 
business models, various network management options, and the degree to which they demand 
network neutrality and interconnection.  Firms that don’t satisfy customers’ needs will lose out 
to firms that do.  The job of the FCC is to put the customer in the driver’s seat.  This leads us to 
make two specific policy recommendations to the FCC: (i) make more spectrum available for 
licensed use; and (ii) ensure that customers have the information they need to make informed 
decisions. 
Wireless Innovation –The Story Thus Far 
Virtually anyone anywhere in the world is aware of the speed of innovation of wireless 
handsets over the past decade.  New handsets of ever-increasing functionality appear weekly, 
in every country in the world.4  But rapid innovation has occurred throughout the vertical 
chain of the wireless industry: applications, devices and core network.  Although the 
innovation in handsets/devices (and applications) has been most obvious to customers, 
innovation in the core network has been just as rapid if not as visible. 
In this section, we review recent innovations in applications, devices and core network.  The 
innovation record in the first two segments is unsurprising, but certainly worth studying.  The 
innovation record in core networks should not be a surprise, as networks have become much 
more capable over the past five years.  But the innovation process is less obvious, more 
behind-the-scenes, and yet it is perhaps the most important situ of innovation because network 
innovation enables all the innovation in the other segments.  We discuss how innovation must 
necessarily be integrated across all three segments in this industry, which is in stark contrast to 
innovation in the PC/Internet ecosystem. 
Innovation in Applications 
Software applications for wireless phones have gone from essentially zero a few years ago to 
tens of thousands of applications today.  Software vendors, device vendors and carriers offer 
apps stores, each offering hundreds or thousands of applications for download, some free, 
some for a fee.  A current list of apps stores: 
Device Manufacturer  URL to App Store 
Apple’s App Store  http://www.apple.com/iphone/apps-for-iphone/  
BlackBerry’s App World  http://na.blackberry.com/eng/services/appworld/  
Palm’s App Catalog  http://www.palm.com/us/products/software/mobile--5- 
 
applications.html  
Nokia’s Ovi Store  https://store.ovi.com  
Samsung’s Application Store  http://www.samsungapps.com 
Sony’s PlayNow arena  http://www.playnow-arena.com  
LG’s Application Store  http://www.lgapplication.com 
Software Developers   
Google’s Android Market  www.android.com/market 




Carriers   
AT&T’s MEdia Mall  http://mediamall.wireless.att.com  
Verizon Wireless’ Tools & 
Applications 
http://products.vzw.com/index.aspx?id=fnd_toolsApps_all 
Sprint’s Software Store  http://softwarestore.sprint.com  
US Cellular’s easyedge  http://easyedge.uscc.com/easyedge/Home.do  




Cricket’s Downloads  http://www.mycricket.com/cricketfeaturesdownloads/  
Independent Stores   
Handango  http://www.handango.com  
GetJar  http://www.getjar.com  
Table 1 
Current Application Stores/Websites 
What demonstrates the extremely rapid pace of innovation in the applications segment is the 
fact that the Apple’s affiliated app store was established in July, 2008; almost all of the rest of the 
affiliated stores have started up in only the last year.  (Some stores are older; Handango was 
founded in 1999 and GetJar in 2004, and AT&T’s in 2004.)   
The range of applications available is also worth a look, as nothing like this existed a decade 
ago, and demonstrates the extraordinary inventiveness of software developers.  A few selected 
applications, from the useful to the social to the wacky: 
Application & URL Link  Function 
AroundMe  lists critical services based on your location 
Pandora Internet Radio  creates your own personal music station 




uses device’s GPS technology to not only identify 
their current location, but also identify their 
proximity to friends using the same application 
Shazam 
www.android.com/market/free.ht
identify songs they hear on the radio through 
applications that tie into their device’s -6- 
 
ml#app=shazam   microphone 
X-Plane 9 Flight Simulator 
http://www.x-
plane.com/pg_Meet_Mobile.html 
play games that use the device’s accelerometer to 
control characters and vehicles 
Table 2 
Selected Applications 
Many of these applications are specifically designed to take advantage of particular features in 
the devices, operating systems and networks for which they were designed.  The lesson here is 
clear: innovation in applications often depends critically on innovation in other segments of 
the industry. 
And customers are using apps, particularly on the most capable devices.  Stone (2009) reports 
that Apple has sold more than 30 million iPhones since their introduction and customers have 
downloaded more than 2 billion apps (from an inventory of 85,000).  This works out to 66 apps 
per iPhone.  Communications Daily (2009) quotes Cole Bradman, Chief Technology and 
Innovation officer of T-Mobile, which sells the Google/Android phone, that they support 
10,000 apps for the Android and their customers download an average of 40 apps for their 
Android phones. 
The outpouring of applications over the last 15 months mimics the outpouring of applications 
that occurred in the decade following the introduction of Windows on the personal computer 
and the outpouring of applications in the decade after the widespread use of the Internet.  
Some have argued (Wu (2007)) that applications were more difficult to write and have 
accepted in the wireless ecosystem than in the Internet/PC ecosystem.  It is certainly true that 
applications that are sold in device vendor or carrier app stores usually must pass stringent 
compatibility tests,5 which is not the case in the PC/Internet applications market.  However, 
the number of applications available belies the assertion that these compatibility tests were a 
barrier to innovation.  In fact, the pace of introduction of new applications seems to be 
overwhelming to customers.  CNET (2009) quotes Brodman of T-Mobile stating that “T-Mobile 
hasn't ‘cracked the code’ on how to expose customers to applications among the many offered 
for Google Android smartphones … The importance and difficulty of aiding users' ‘discovery’ 
of apps have grown as the Android Market online has expanded to more than 10,000 
offerings.” 
 
Innovation in Devices 
In a recent ex parte filing with the FCC, CTIA documents that there are at least 33 device 
manufacturers selling over 630 different handsets in the US.  The worldwide figure is even 
higher, and device manufacturing is a worldwide business.  US customers can thus tap into 
ingenuity and invention of manufacturers in Europe, Canada, East Asia and elsewhere, as well 
as the US in the handset market.6 -7- 
 
We take a direct approach to demonstrating innovation in handsets: we list some of the many 
major handset launches over the past several years: 
Date Product  Announcement 
6/29/07 AT&T  Apple 
iPhone 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPhone  








7/10/08  Apple iPhone 3G  http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=25146 



























11/21/08 VZW  Blackberry 
Storm 
http://news.vzw.com/news/2008/11/pr2008-11-
20.html   




2/26/09  VZW LG Versa  http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?co
mmand=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9128679&intsrc=ne
ws_ts_head 




















LG Watch Phone  http://ces.cnet.com/8301-19167_1-10137452-100.html 
Table 3 
Selected Handheld Device Launches 
Note that while the headlines focus on high-end phones, especially those that compete with 
the iPhone, new low-cost phones continue to be introduced with new features and functions.  
Device innovation benefits the entire product range, not just the high end. 
What is most compelling about this list is how rapidly new handsets are introduced, each one 
offering features undreamed of five years ago.  And the pace continues:  Richtel (2009) of the 
New York Times reports that Google has announced 18 new Android handsets will be 
introduced by EOY 2009 by device makers.  Clearly, innovation is alive and well in the 
handheld device segment of the wireless marketplace. 
Innovation in Core Networks 
The carrier segment of the wireless industry is least understood by the general public, in that 
their service, while at the core of the business, is largely invisible.  We hold handset devices in 
our hand and use them every day.  Similarly, we experience applications very directly when 
we use them.  But the radio signals, the receivers, the processors, the backhaul networks are 
simply invisible to us.  Of course, we spot the occasional cell tower as we drive, but that is 
usually the extent of our awareness.  We know, of course, that what makes our cell phones 
work is radio, connecting us to the phone network and the Internet via controlled and directed 
electromagnetic radiation, together with the processing at both the handset and the cell tower, 
but what is it that really goes on?  If we are in a “dead zone,” we know we are out of our 
carrier’s coverage area and cannot make calls.  We know we may drop calls if the capacity of 
the closest tower is exceeded by lots of voice or data traffic.  But most of us know little or 
nothing about the “magic” that happens between our cell phones and our carriers. 
At its most basic, carriers are assigned radio frequencies over which our voice and data signals 
are sent to carrier receivers.  Many customers may be using a given tower/receiver, sharing 
frequencies to do so.  The more frequencies (more “bandwidth”) the more capacity that cell 
tower has to move voice and data traffic.  Carriers obtain these frequencies in different parts of 
the country by bidding in an FCC auction for licenses to use the bandwidth they need to move 
traffic.  Of necessity, this resource is quite limited, and the FCC has limited the amount of 
licensed spectrum available for mobile wireless (Commercial Mobile Radio Service, or CMRS) 
communications.  In spite of this scarcity of spectrum, carriers have been able to utilize this -9- 
 
resource with ever-increasing efficiency to offer more voice services and more recently more 
data services over mobile phones. 
Innovation in the core network, therefore, can be conceived as increasing spectral efficiency.  
Increased spectral efficiency is manifest to customers as increased capacity to make voice calls 
and increased speeds by which our phones access the Internet, download our e-mail, and 
allow us to watch video on our handsets, based on the very limited resource of spectrum.  
Innovation in spectrum use takes place in laboratories7 and research centers and real world 
networks around the world, and consists of scientists and engineers determining better, more 
efficient protocols for sending and receiving information over the air using less spectrum.  In 
its simplest terms, spectral efficiency is about how many bits (i.e., information) can be 
successfully transmitted per megahertz (Mhz) (i.e., bandwidth) of spectrum. 
Innovation in core networks often takes the form of standard-setting, as new means of using 
the carrier’s spectrum must be accompanied by new devices, and device manufacturers must 
have standards to which they build their handsets or else they won’t work on the network.  
Therefore, we often see core network innovation manifest in an alphabet soup of protocol 
initials: CDMA, GSM, WiMAX, 3G, 4G, EV-DO Rev A, HSDPA, UMTS, and LTE, to name a 
few.  Each is a network protocol, and each represents an advance in spectral efficiency: 
Service  Standard  System Spectral Efficiency8 (Bits/sec)/Hz 
2G GSM  1993  0.17 
2.75G GSM+EDGE  0.33 
3G  CDMA 2000  0.172 (fully loaded) 
3G  1x EV-DO Rev A  1.3 (average load) 
3G WCDMA  0.51 
3.5g HSDPA  2.88 
WiMAX IEEE  802.16  1.2 
4G LTE  16.32  max 
WiFi IEEE  802.11b/g  2.4 
Table 4 
System Spectral Efficiency of Selected Network Standards 
(from Wikipedia, Spectral Efficiency) 
Overall, how does US carriers’ spectral efficiency measure up?  Campbell (2009) finds that the 
US leads all OECD countries in subscribers served per Mhz of spectrum allocated.  US carriers 
are more efficient than Japan, more efficient than Korea, and more efficient than any European 
country.  US carrier innovation in networks allows our networks to be far more efficient than 
any other country.  Could this be because US customers use less voice and less data?  As it 
turns out, the same report shows that US customers use far more voice and data than 
customers in other countries.  So yes, innovation in the core network has made us a world 
leader in managing the scarce resource of spectrum and providing capacity to meet the 
world’s most demanding customers.  -10- 
 
How does this innovation in spectral efficiency affect customers?  Again, we list 
announcements of major deployments of network innovations: 
Date Action  Link 
11/29/07 VZW  announces 


















5/5/08 T-Mobile  begins 
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11/4/08 nTelos  upgrades 
70% of sites to 
EVDO Rev A 
http://ir.ntelos.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=345
339 






2/24/09  AT&T 3G to 
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9/20/09  T-Mobile rolls out 




Selected Market Deployments of Network Innovations 
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And data traffic that is soaring; Cisco (2009) estimates mobile data traffic is increasing at the 












The one item that isn’t soaring is spectrum licensed by the FCC to the carriers.  So if capacity 
isn’t increasing, how is it the carriers are handling vastly increased traffic?  The answer is core 
network innovation which leads to substantially increased spectral efficiency.  Carriers are 
doing more with less. 
Wireless Innovation – A Collaborative Venture 
In the previous subsection, we separately reviewed innovations in each segment of the 
wireless industry, noting rapid introduction and deployment of new technology for 
applications, devices, and the core networks.  But the innovation process in wireless is not at 
all separate; it is a collaborative venture between and among the three separate segments.  
Innovations in devices depend crucially upon innovations in core networks, and innovations 
in applications depend crucially upon innovations in devices and core networks.  And the 
applications that customers demand drive innovations in all three segments.  Customers 
demand access to the Internet and other data services, so Internet applications are developed, 
devices become Internet-enabled, and core networks ensure that capacity is available for high-
speed data through spectral efficiency innovation.  All of this innovation is driven by customer 
demand; it is customer-centric innovation.  To achieve this, cooperation and collaboration is 
required among all three segments. 
Both device manufacturers and carriers establish standards and protocols that application 
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developers’ website devCentral at 
http://developer.cingular.com/developer/?_requestid=136448, and Verizon Wireless’s 
developers’ website at http://developer.verizon.com/jsps/devCenters/wireless/index.jsp).  
Carriers and manufacturers hold conferences and tutorials on how application developers can 
become certified to offer applications on their platforms, ensuring that developers can focus 
their efforts on applications that work with their target platforms. 
Manufacturers of handsets and carriers must work closely to ensure that the phones and the 
networks function as they must to maintain quality transmission and use the spectrum 
efficiently.  Since they are innovating in a competitive environment, they must tightly control 
both costs and power drain.  As carriers develop new protocols to increase network 
performance, they must work with device makers who will build the handsets that use these 
protocols and do so with the device makers’ needs in mind.  The alphabet soup of standards 
are developed jointly in standards committees with carriers and device makers both party to 
the development of these standards, each representing the needs of their firm to enable 
innovation on both sides of the market to move forward.  Without devices to use standards 
such as 4G LTE, networks need not bother with building ultra-high-capacity data networks, 
and without the networks to transmit 4G LTE the device makers need not bother building the 
next generation of ultra-high-speed broadband handsets.  And without these collaborative 
innovations, developers need not bother building the applications such as IP TV that can use 
these ultra-high-speed connections. 
A current example from McKeough (2009) brings this techno-speak down to earth.  “AT&T is 
developing a software tool and networking platform that will use wireless devices to record a 
patient's health measurements at home and send the data to the doctor…[using a wireless 
technology] named ZigBee, which receives data from medical sensors. ZigBee consumes 
considerably less power, so monitoring devices, including thermometers, pill dispensers, 
blood-pressure monitors, and pulse oximeters, can use small batteries to transmit data over 
long periods of time….If a physician notices, for instance, that a blood-pressure medication 
isn't working, or if the patient isn't taking the drugs regularly, she'll be able to arrange a 
videoconference with the patient to discuss solutions.” 
In contrast, innovation in the wireline Internet can be highly compartmentalized.  Innovation 
in transmission, either to the home or among backbone providers is largely focused on 
improved fiber optic links and improved cable standards such as DOCSIS 3, and innovation in 
routing is largely focused on faster Internet servers.  At the customer end, hardware 
innovation is largely focused on PCs and other terminal devices (including WiFi), and is 
independent of network innovations.  Applications developers need not concern themselves 
with network innovations or PC innovations, and so can innovate independently.  Of course, 
each segment must be able to forecast the capabilities of the complementary segments, but 
they often don’t need to actually collaborate to innovate.  In the wireline Internet/PC 
ecosystem, innovation can proceed independently.  In the wireless ecosystem, innovation 
proceeds only through close cooperation among all segments of the industry. -14- 
 
The rationale for this difference resides in the nature of the interfaces among the segments of 
the two industries.  In the case of the Internet/PC ecosystem, many application developers 
choose to write code for a single operating system: Windows on which the vast majority of 
PCs run,9 and one network protocol: TCP/IP.  The interface between applications and the 
PC/OS is well-understood and time-tested; and TCP/IP has been the simple Internet standard 
for over twenty years.  Similarly, PC manufacturers need only consider the simple TCP/IP 
interface when designing hardware to work with the Internet.  In both cases, the interface 
between segments is straightforward, standardized and well-understood.  In the wireless 
world, the interfaces among segments are far more complex.  Devices and the core network 
must work together quite closely during a voice or data transmission in order to ensure that 
the carrier can make the most efficient use of the spectrum, and that the devices comply with 
the complex task of real-time spectrum management.10  Applications as well must be vetted to 
ensure that they work safely with both the devices and the core network, as they can interfere 
with the proper functioning of the radio channel.  No such concerns exist in the wired 
Internet/PC ecosystem.  It is the complexity of these interfaces that demand collaboration of 
innovation in the wireless ecosystem which is simply not present in the wired Internet/PC 
ecosystem.11 
Another difference between the Internet/PC ecosystem and the wireless ecosystem is that 
there has been much less competition in standards or operating systems in the Internet/PC 
world, while competition among standards and operating systems has been vigorous in the 
wireless ecosystem, and that competition has been an important driver of innovation.  
Handheld operating systems include Apple vs. Google vs Microsoft vs Symbian vs. Blackbery 
vs. Palm webOS vs. Nokia Maemo vs. Linux vs. ...  In the PC world, there is, for all practical 
purposes, Windows.  In the wireless core network high-speed data world, there is HSPA, EV-
DO, WiMAX, and LTE.  In the Internet/PC world, there is TCP/IP.  Greenstein (2009) 
concludes that “because standards are extraordinarily important and valuable in introducing 
innovation to the value chain, their development and rollout anticipates new services and 
inventive activity.  There are often multiple solutions to similar problems, so competition 
between standards proxies for multiple solutions for users.”  In short, “standards competition 
beats the alternative” and “standards designed in the absence of competition are usually much 
worse.” 
Experienced Internet pros often advocate the Internet model of innovation; we believe there 
are important lessons to be learned from the Internet, but innovation in the wireless ecosystem 
is very different from innovation in the Internet.  Lessons from Internet innovation must be 
applied to wireless innovation judiciously, with due respect for these differences. 
This is not to say that collaboration is all sweetness and light; firms in different segments have 
different needs, and when standards are being hammered out in committee meetings, conflict 
can be expected.  Each application provider must deliver a different product for each device 
using a different operating system.  Each device maker must deliver a different product for 
each carrier using a different network standard; the process is likely contentious.  But -15- 
 
ultimately, in a competitive industry, all firms have a common interest in delivering what the 
customer wants and needs.  Only if the innovation process is customer-centric will these firms 
survive.  Collaboration is the necessary survival strategy. 
Does this complex innovation process work?  Can the competitive market deliver the goods 
when it comes to innovation?  Tables 1-5 tells us the answer: the market has delivered 
innovation.  Another measure of innovation is the number of patents granted related to 
CMRS.12  The data show substantial and increasing patent activity in this industry: 
 
Figure 3 
Licensed CMRS Patents Granted 
Source: CTIA (2009) 
The evidence tells a compelling story of innovation at breakneck speed in all segments of the 
industry.  It also tells a story of collaborative innovation, a rather different story than has 
occurred in the wired Internet/PC ecosystem.  It has been an ecosystem driven by customer-
centric outcomes, to which we now turn. 
Wireless Competition – In Products/Services and in Innovation 
Wireless Competition is the subject of another proceeding, and the topic has been amply and 
expertly discussed by our colleagues Michael Katz (2009) and Bobby Willig (2009).  However, 
the topic is particularly important to innovation in the wireless ecosystem, and so it bears a 
brief discussion in this paper.  Our primary focus, however, is on competition in innovation; 
competition in product markets may lead to competition in innovation, but not necessarily.  
We ask: has innovation in wireless markets been related to competition in these markets? -16- 
 
Competition in Products/Services 
Of the three segments of the wireless industry, both applications segments and device 
segments compete for customers worldwide with many players which are without question 
highly competitive.  We need not belabor the obvious, so we focus our attention on core 
network providers (carriers).  The carrier segment is rather different than either the 
applications or device segments.  Although carriers can operate nationally and globally, there 
may be local variations.  Customers tend to buy their cell service in the metro area where they 
live.  Competition therefore can be more of a local issue; for example, is the carrier segment in 
Philadelphia competitive?  How about in Pittsburgh?  In principle, the answers to these two 
questions could be different.13  It is also a capital intensive industry, requiring substantial 
investments in towers, radio equipment, switching and backhaul.  This might lead one to 
expect that the carrier segment would be highly concentrated and not very competitive.  We 
use several simple measures to show that this is not the case; the carrier segment is not 
concentrated and has resulted in lower prices and higher volumes than anywhere else in the 
world. 
Do wireless customers have choices of carriers?  In fact, 95% of the US population has access to 


































































1 Carrier 2 Carriers 3 Carriers 4 Carriers 5 Carriers 6 or More Carriers
Figure 4 
US Population with Access to Multiple Wireless Carriers 




And customers have no qualms about changing their carriers; the FCC (2009) found that 
between 15% and 40% of customers change carriers every year.  With number portability, 
changing carriers is easy, and customers show that they are willing to move.  It is no wonder 
that the FCC found in the same report (at ¶1) that CMRS services are effectively competitive. 
Given the capital intensity of the industry, one might expect that traditional antitrust measures 
would show substantial concentration.  In fact, the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)14 
shows rather the opposite.  The US CMRS segment has an HHI of 2280, barely above the 
threshold of 1800 (below which antitrust issues are dismissed out of hand) and is the lowest 
HHI of any country in the world (Campbell (2009)).15 
But do these measures of competition impact customers?  We use two simple measures of 
impact on customers, based on international comparisons.  Average revenue per minute (our 
best proxy for price) is lower in the US than in any other OECD country (Campbell (2009)):16 
 
Figure 5 
Revenue per Minute, OECD Countries 
Source: Campbell (2009) 
As might be expected, lower prices lead to greater demand, and the US has more minutes of use 




Average Minutes of Use per Customer, OECD Countries 
Source: Campbell (2009) 
Again, we defer to our colleagues Michael Katz (2009) and Bobby Willig (2009) whose work on 
CMRS competitiveness is definitive.  Our efforts here are simply indicative, easy-to-
understand measures of competitiveness, which we recognize as incomplete, if nevertheless 
quite suggestive. 
Competition in Innovation 
The previous subsection considered (quite briefly) static competition, and examines the effect 
of marketplace structure on prices and outputs.  But a more important question in the wireless 
ecosystem is dynamic competition, or competition among firms to introduce new products, 
services and network advances.17 
The analysis of the previous section provides us with the answers.   
  In the application segment, we have gone from dozens of applications to over 100,000 
applications in the past decade, and one recent event stands out as the driver of this 
explosion of innovation: the establishment of Apple’s iPhone apps store.  Previously, 
carriers were cautious about accepting new applications.  Perhaps it took a new entrant 
(Apple) into the industry to show that customers really did want lots of applications 
and firms could turn a profit by encouraging applications.  In the fifteen months since 
the introduction of the Apple App Store, dozens of stores have sprung up, driven by the 
competitive necessity of matching Apple’s business model innovation.  As noted, most 
app store launches followed very quickly after the launch of Apple’s App Store. -19- 
 
  In the device segment, the technology race was already on prior to the introduction of 
the iPhone, but clearly the iPhone raised the bar for other device makers.  Within 
months, manufacturers in East Asia, Canada and Europe were rushing to market with 
iPhone wannabe’s, some quite successful.  Would Blackberry have rushed the Storm 
and the Tour to market without the competitive push of the iPhone?  Would Palm have 
rushed the Pre to market without the competitive push of iPhone (and Blackberry)?  In 
the device market, we see a virtuous circle, in which innovation begets further 
innovation, as manufacturers innovate in order to stay in the game.  Yesterday’s cell 
phone18 state of the art, e.g., the Palm Treo, is simply no longer salable; it is competition 
in innovation which has led to this cutthroat but dynamically efficient result.  In his 
analysis of the device market, Levy (2009) states that US wireless customers are the 
beneficiaries of a “brutal technology competition that is making the chariot race in Ben Hur 
look like a stroll in the park.” 
  In the core network segment, competition takes place over network capacity and 
coverage.  From our TV commercials, we know that “more bars in more places” is 
important to customers.  But we also know that “the fastest 3G network” is also 
important.  Both are related to the carrier’s use of advanced networking standards that 
provide the spectral efficiency needed to ensure capacity for both voice and data.  Table 
4 and Table 5 demonstrate that network standards of ever-increasing spectral efficiency 
are a competitive necessity in the core network business.  Both AT&T and Verizon 
Wireless have announced plans to deploy LTE, a true 4G technology which promises 
achievable wireless broadband speeds in the 8-12 Mbps range (Segan (2009)).  
Sprint/Clearwire has already deployed WiMAX in Baltimore, Portland, Atlanta and Las 
Vegas (Davies (2009)).  Firms have found out that customers want bandwidth, and the 
firm that can deliver that bandwidth will get the business.  Even as AT&T Wireless has 
invested billions of dollars to keep up with the data demands of its iPhone customers by 
expanding its 3G capabilities, it is planning for its 4G LTE in the near future.  It simply 
cannot let its competitors open up a technological lead. 
Innovation and Competition – Conclusion 
The Federal Communications Commission has a long tradition of keeping hands off wireless 
(and the Internet) while ensuring it remains competitive.  The results of this policy are evident: 
the most innovative industry in the US and the world, with lower prices, more usage, and 
more innovation.  In fact, the competitive market has lifted the US from being a wireless 
laggard compared to Europe and East Asia, and the US is now recognized as the leader in the 
wireless industry (Strategy Analytics (2009)).  The FCC has allowed the competitive market to 
work its magic, and that is exactly what it has done.  As it turns out, that policy has indeed 
been customer-centric.  Customers are in the driver’s seat; when they want better handsets, 
manufacturers, sometimes in collaboration with network provider partners, innovate.  When 
they want more bandwidth, carriers innovate.  When they want more applications, developers 
(and the other segments) innovate.  In this competitive wireless marketplace, firms survive by -20- 
 
giving customers their best value proposition, and this means innovation.  We strongly 
recommend that this hands-off policy continue.  We see no market failures in this market, so 
there is no rationale for government intervention.  If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it! 
Do We Need “Fixes”? 
The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry raises several issues which could be targets for FCC intervention.  
In essence, the NOI asks if there are market failures which it ought to fix.  Since our previous 
analysis suggests that there are no market failures in this industry, the quick answer is (again): 
if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!  The FCC has had the wisdom in the past to let the competitive 
market develop without meddling, and this policy has been a successful customer-centric 
policy.  If one carrier is not providing sufficient value by, say, encouraging application 
developers via an app store, then another carrier will be happy to take his business by giving 
customers what they want.  Of course, this is precisely what happened with the Apple App 
Store; customers liked it, and competitors were forced to emulate it.  This is precisely what 
happened with 3G in core networks; customers liked it, and competitors were forced to 
emulate it.  Should the FCC opt for a more interventionist policy without rigorous justification 
of demonstrated market failure, the result will be clear:  higher costs, less customer choice, 
reduced incentives to invest and reduced incentives to innovate. 
We consider each issue raised by the NOI in turn. 
Mandate Spectrum Sharing 
On the basis of a study conducted in Washington, DC (McHenry et al. (2003)) some years ago 
that showed that spectrum in the 30 Mhz-3Ghz bands to be underutilized,19 the NOI asks if 
sharing of licensed spectrum should be mandated.  Some suggest that underlays (low-power 
uses of licensed spectrum) would create little interference and overlays (high-power uses such 
as cognitive radio that would be “smart” and not interfere with licensed use) would increase 
the efficiency of licensed spectrum. 
We first address the issue of whether spectrum licensed for CMRS is underutilized; some 
critics have alleged that carriers are “warehousing” spectrum (that is, not leasing spectrum for 
which they hold licenses but are not currently utilizing) for anticompetitive reasons.20  Our 
previous discussion concerning core network innovation spoke of the substantial efforts of 
carriers to increase spectral efficiency and operating procedures to increase capacity 
utilization.  It would hardly make sense to undertake such capital intensive efforts if carriers 
had excess spectrum lying about.  It would also hardly make sense that carriers who have paid 
billions of dollars at auction to buy the spectrum would allow it to go to waste.  So on the face 
of it, allegations of underutilization of CMRS licensed spectrum21 defy all economic logic.22   
Several other studies conducted in Chicago by Illinois Institute of Technology researchers 
(McDonald (2007), McDonald et al. (2008)) found that CMRS spectrum was in fact efficiently 
utilized, although other spectrum was not.  In fact, no one who has studied the potential for -21- 
 
spectrum sharing ever seriously considered using the heavily utilized CMRS spectrum, but 
focused on lightly used spectrum as potential targets for sharing.   
But we need not depend only upon economic logic; we have facts to support the view that US 
carriers use their spectrum quite efficiently.  As mentioned above, Campbell (2009) finds that 
US carriers serve many more customers per allocated bandwidth than any other country.  The 
following is excerpted from that study: 
              US            Japan       Germany       UK            France       Italy         Canada      Spain        S. Korea    Mexico 
 
Table 6 
Subscribers per Mhz of Spectrum Allocated 
Source, Campbell (2009) 
Both the logic and the evidence clearly indicate that spectrum utilization by US carriers is just 
fine; there is no evidence that suggests that a regulatory “fix” can have a positive effect; it is 
more likely to have serious negative effects. 
We are generally of the view that low-power uses have shown their worth in practice and we 
encourage their deployment.  In fact, it is for this very reason that the FCC established Part 15 
unlicensed bands, so that low-power uses such as baby monitors, cordless phones, garage door 
openers and WiFi could flourish, as they have.  In recent years, the FCC has designated large 
swathes of spectrum as unlicensed, and this is the appropriate location for low-power 
operations, as history has demonstrated.  Imposing low-power applications in spectrum with 
existing licenses is totally unnecessary, as there is more than enough unlicensed spectrum 
available for such applications.  If such uses are truly non-interfering and for some reason 
cannot find a home in the unlicensed space, then assuming the licensees are in the business of 
making money, they will surely permit such low-power uses for a market price.  Mandating 
low-power sharing is simply regulating the price of low-power use of a licensee’s spectrum at 
zero.  Let the licensee decide whether or not it can tolerate interference; the market will set a 
competitive price that fully accounts for interference or lack thereof.  This is not a suitable task 
for government. 
We are also of the view that cognitive radio is a promising technology in its early experimental 
stage, and should be encouraged.  It is not, however, a technology ready to be released in the 
valuable and fully utilized CMRS bands.  While some engineers and legal scholars suggest it 
can be made non-interfering, it has yet to be field-tested and so remains experimental and 
untried.  In other work, Faulhaber (2005, 2008) raises issues with cognitive radio that suggest 
much work needs to be done before we let the cognitive radio out of the regulatory box.  In 
any case, even if cognitive radio eventually proves its worth, there is no reason that it should 
be mandated in any licensed spectrum, particularly the heavily utilized CMRS bands.  If 
cognitive radio is a going concern, it can certainly pay its own way; licensees (who are no -22- 
 
doubt a profit-making bunch) will be happy to permit truly non-interfering uses for a 
competitively determined market price.  There is no reason that this particular technology 
should get a free ride on spectrum. 
In fact, carriers are quite comfortable with both transacting spectrum (there is an active 
secondary market in spectrum) and sharing spectrum.  The entire Mobile Virtual Network 
Operator (MVNO) market is based on third parties using carrier spectrum in order to offer 
competitive mobile phone service.  Indeed, virtually all the major carriers host at least one 
MVNO; Sprint is perhaps the most active in this market.  It should be no surprise that if a 
carrier thinks it can make a buck sharing spectrum, it will certainly do so, as the MVNO 
experience demonstrated.  Accommodating a truly non-interfering overlay or underlay should 
be fairly straightforward.  As in the MVNO market, a market price will emerge and parties 
will find it in their mutual interest to transact.  Intervening in this market by setting a zero 
price seems a totally unnecessary and highly distortionary regulatory intervention.  There is 
no market failure here, and therefore no rationale for intervention.  Should the FCC wish to 
mandate sharing of spectrum as a result of special pleadings at the expense of existing and 
future licensees and customers, there is no need to dress it up in the language of efficiency and 
innovation. 
Develop network policies that foster wireless broadband 
Are there policies the FCC can adopt to foster the deployment of 4G and future technologies?  
What are they?  Yes, yes, yes there is a clear and simple policy the FCC can adopt to foster 
wireless broadband: auction off much more licensed spectrum.  If there is one policy that the FCC 
should adopt in this proceeding, this is it.  Carriers are now approaching the theoretical limits 
of spectrum capacity and yet traffic shows no sign of abating.  As noted above, Cisco (2009) is 
forecasting wireless data annual growth rates of 130%, principally from the customer demand 
for TV to the handheld.  At that rate, carriers will hit their maximum capacity in a few years. 
A study by the ITU (2006) forecasts a “total  spectrum  requirement  of  as  much  as  840  MHz 
 by  2010,  1300  MHz  by  2015  and  1720  MHz  by  the  year  2020.  Even  at  a  lower  market 
 development  rate,  the  projections  are  760  MHz  by  2010,  1300  MHz  by  2015  and  1280 
 MHz  by  2020.”  Current spectrum available to CMRS is well under 500 Mhz (under 400 Mhz 
by some estimates (Rysavy (2008)).  By any measure, the industry is approaching a licensed 
spectrum capacity crisis.  The FCC must step up now and auction off lots and lots of spectrum. 
Exactly how much is “lots and lots”?  In earlier work, Faulhaber (2009a) suggested that an 
additional 1 Ghz would probably be a good starting point.  The ITU estimates suggest that this 
guess was close, and we adopt this as our recommendation: 1 Ghz of spectrum put up for 
auction for licensed spectrum.23 
Easy for us to say; what, the FCC might well ask, spectrum did we have in mind?  Where do 
we think 1 Ghz of spectrum will come from, seeing as virtually all the usable spectrum has 
already been allocated to someone or something?  This brings to mind the well-known 
criticism that much of the spectrum is unused most of the time, an argument the authors made -23- 
 
in Faulhaber & Farber (2003).  Maybe it is time for the FCC to reclaim spectrum that is lying 
fallow; there will no doubt be a price to do this, but correcting past mistakes is never cheap.  
We have two solutions for finding spectrum; the “business as usual” solution and the 
“fundamental change” solution.  Neither is new; both have been before the FCC for some time.  
But now is the time to end the procrastination and get this done. 
The “business as usual” solution: spectrum that could be cleared and re-purposed for licensed 
wireless communications: 
  First, get the AWS-3 spectrum (25 Mhz) into the market; the FCC has had this under 
consideration for some time; act now to find a paired band and auction it. 
  Second, the World Radio Conference (WRC)-07 identified 400 Mhz in the following 
bands: 
o  450-470 Mhz (largely occupied in the US) 
o  698-863 Mhz (includes 700 Mhz which has already been auctioned in the US) 
o  2.3-2.4 Ghz (much of which is occupied in the US) 
o  3.4-3.6 Ghz (used by radar in US) 
  Third, approximately 555 Mhz has been designated as mainly unlicensed U-NII 
spectrum for wireless broadband (although there are other users in these bands).  There 
is minimal use of these bands for wireless broadband, the FCC’s intended purpose for 
U-NII.  
  Fourth, the FCC has recently freed up an average of 34-58 Mhz of the TV white space 
bands,24 dedicating it to unlicensed uses.  The evidence has shown that this is not likely 
to result in wireless broadband actually being offered to customers.   
In bringing fresh spectrum to market, the FCC needs to be mindful of bandwidth assignments 
internationally.  Spectrum assignments that don’t correlate with worldwide assignments result 
in lost scale economies in handset production and unnecessary costs for carriers. 
The “fundamental change” solution.  In Faulhaber & Farber (2003), we argued that the entire 
FCC process of allocating spectrum was deeply flawed, resulting in vast underutilization of 
spectrum.  We strongly advocated a Coasian market-based solution, in which property rights 
are established in all usable spectrum which would become the licensees’ property to be 
bought, sold, leased, aggregated or subdivided as the licensee saw fit, subject to the technical 
(but not use) restrictions of the license.  We support the Kwerel & Williams (2001) plan25 to 
place all spectrum into the market, permitting existing license holders to sell, trade or keep 
their licenses, thereby freeing up spectrum to move to its highest valued use.  We still strongly 
favor this solution, as it promises to free up large amounts of spectrum for licensed use, 
harnessing the power of the market, rather than the somewhat anemic response of regulators 
thus far.  Of course we recognize the political difficulties involved in this solution.  We also -24- 
 
recognize that it is the FCC’s job to manage these difficulties to ensure the “public interest, 
convenience and necessity.” 
Should the FCC be exploring alternative network architectures such as mesh networks?  We 
are of the view that further work in mesh networks is desirable.  While mesh networks are a 
very interesting field of research there are major problems that still have to be solved prior to 
commercial deployment. The notion of mesh networks is not a new one; past attempts have 
often suffered from the same difficulties as we face now. Security is one of the major issues as 
well as sustaining geographic coverage. There have been a number of experiments in other 
countries, in particular Japan, utilizing this technology in mobile automobile-oriented 
networking. The results of these experiments are illuminating but still suggest caution in the 
belief that this technology is the solution to all our problems. As is usual there are advocates 
for mesh networking -- some have commercial interests they are pursuing and some are 
researchers with strong beliefs about their pet technology. Prior to any commitment of 
spectrum, both government and industry will need to devote considerable resources to 
funding a program of research in this area. This is not being done at present. 
Should experimental work be undertaken in mesh networks, we believe it is best suited to 
deployment in unlicensed spectrum on a trial basis.  Since the FCC has designated very large 
swathes of spectrum to unlicensed uses, this should be ample for experimentation with mesh 
networks.  We certainly hope to see such experimentation; given the level of interest in mesh 
networking, we are in fact surprised it has taken so long.  Should this technology appear to 
have some promise after thorough experimentation and field experience, we believe it will 
find a home in unlicensed spectrum.  Should it require licensed spectrum, we see no reason 
why the market will not work.  Mesh operators can either buy their own spectrum or lease 
capacity from existing licensees, much as MVNOs lease capacity from CMRS carriers today.  
There is no need to mandate sharing of licensed spectrum in order to accommodate this 
technology, if it proves viable. 
In later work, Faulhaber (2005) again argued strongly that dispute resolution in a property 
rights regime would occur in courts rather than at the FCC and that this would substantially 
reduce costs and increase both speed and efficiency.  The evidence suggests that dispute 
resolution, for example in interference disputes mentioned in the NOI, are long, drawn-out 
regulatory battles often followed by a court case.  If licensees had clearly defined property 
rights, then interference disputes could be resolved like trespass cases within the court 
system.26 We continue to believe, based on the evidence, that resolution of interference claims 
in court is substantially less costly, faster and more efficient27 than resolution at the FCC. 
Mandated “Openness” 
The well-known paper by Wu (2007) argued that wireless carriers have blocked application 
providers, caused device makers to “cripple” their phones, and violated network neutrality 
“regulations”.  In fact, many of these allegations applied only to isolated examples at the time 
they were made, and since that time virtually all of the carriers have made it quite easy for -25- 
 
application providers to write apps for their networks.  Carriers such as AT&T now have a 
“bring your own phone” plan.  Are we to conclude that Tim Wu’s paper caused the carriers to 
see the light and change their evil ways?  Of course not.  It was competition that did the trick.  
When the iPhone showed that customers really loved apps, then everyone else responded.  
When some customers wanted to bring their own phones, carriers responded.  A competitive 
market imposes the discipline on firms to meet their customers’ demands.  Regulators and 
government bureaucrats can certainly impose discipline by law, but is this what customers 
want?  If the FCC were truly customer-centric, it would let customers decide what they want.  
It would recognize that its job is to enable customers, not to tell customers what they ought to 
want. 
Can customers tell the difference between open systems and managed systems?  The Apple 
iPhone is well-known to be a managed system; techies take pride in “jail-breaking” their 
iPhones in order to use them on other networks and other off-standard uses.  Apple has set up 
restrictions on what you can do with your iPhone that are more stringent than, say, what you 
can do with your Blackberry,28 or even more your Android phone.  Yet the iPhone remains the 
most popular smartphone in the market today, after three years in the market.  Customers 
have the choice: the managed model of Apple or the more “open” model of Android  It is true 
that applications from sources other than the Android store can be loaded on Android-based 
devices (Apple allows only iTunes apps to be loaded).  It is no surprise that some customers 
like the more managed iPhone and some customers like the more “do-it-yourself” approach of 
Android devices.  In either case, these phones represent impressive innovations and should be 
lauded as such.  And in either case, customers choose what they want, without the help of 
government bureaucrats forcing them to have one or the other. 
Our view of network management practices is much the same.  Different carriers will adopt 
different network management strategies; provided customers are informed (see below) as to 
what their carriers are up to, they can make informed decisions about which carriers will get 
their business.  Network management that is too restrictive, perhaps anticompetitive, will be 
punished by customers.  Likewise, network management that is too lax, that permits outages 
and dropped calls because of congestion will also be punished.  Again, let the customer decide 
what level of network management they prefer.  And again, we expect different customers will 
make different choices.  What we know for sure is that this is not a choice government 
bureaucrats should be making for customers. 
There is no market failure here.  Mandating “openness” is quite unnecessary, as the 
competitive market will produce what customers want.  The evidence in this market is that is 
exactly what is happening, without counterproductive and inefficient government mandates.  
There is nothing broken here; there is nothing to fix.  “Hands off” is the customer-centric 
policy in a competitive market. -26- 
 
Network Neutrality 
On September 21, 2009, Chairman Genachowski announced in a speech at the Brookings 
Institution that he would be initiating a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make 
binding the four Network Neutrality principles the FCC adopted under Chairman Powell, 
plus two new ones: non-discrimination and transparency.   
We find much to like in the Chairman’s speech.  The Chairman’s rhetoric emphasized that 
FCC actions should be “fact-based” and not respond to “imaginary” threats.  He also 
emphasized he wasn’t advocating regulating the Internet.  And yet the content of his speech 
belied the rhetoric.  In asserting that network neutrality in the wired and wireless ecosystems 
was necessary to preserve innovation, there was not one shred of evidence adduced that 
shows innovation is being harmed.  In the face of the very substantial amount of innovation 
occurring in all segments of the wireless industry, the allegation that innovation is under some 
sort of threat in wireless is demonstrably false and beyond incredible.  The Chairman’s 
assertions that this does not constitute regulation of the Internet is also beyond credible: 
imposing constraints on carrier pricing (zero charges on application providers), on carrier 
product differentiation (no expedited service), and on how carriers are permitted to manage 
their own networks certainly sounds like regulation.  Even worse, adopting “reasonable” 
network management as a rule introduces great uncertainly into the market; exactly what 
behaviors will incur the wrath of the regulator?  Don’t know; we’ll punish you when we see it.  
If ever a policy was designed to increase cost, reduce customer choice, reduce incentives to 
innovate and reduce incentives for carriers to invest, this would be it.29  Where’s the market 
failure?  Where is the rigor by which the Chairman has arrived at this conclusion? 
There has been a long debate over network neutrality in the policy community, to which both 
authors have contributed (see especially Farber & Katz (2007)) which we need not rehash here.  
While network neutrality advocates are overjoyed, some have sounded alarm bells including 
those most sympathetic to Internet openness.  Tweney (2009) from Wired magazine predicts 
the end of unlimited Internet as a result of network neutrality regulation.  His rationale 
mirrors the principles in this paper.  He notes three problems: 
•  “Bandwidth is not, in fact, unlimited, especially in the wireless world.  ‘As long as there 
have been networks, people have had to engineer them to ensure that congestion doesn’t occur’” 
(quoting Farber). 
•  “Enforcement of neutrality regulations is going to be difficult.” 
•  “New regulations create an additional layer of government bureaucracy where the free 
market has already proven its effectiveness….Now the FCC is proposing taking a free 
market that works, and adding another layer of innovation-stifling regulations on top of 
that?” 
But this is more than the government intervening with no evidence whatsoever of market 
failure.  We believe that this prospective rulemaking is the polar opposite of a customer-centric 
policy.  If network neutrality in wireless is something customers want, then in the competitive -27- 
 
carrier market a competitor will offer a neutral network service offering, and customers will 
flock to it.  Other carriers will be forced to follow suit, or not.  In practice, we would expect 
that some carriers would offer a more neutral network and others would offer a more 
managed network, while still others would offer customers the option of either;  customers 
will make different choices, reflecting their different priorities and preferences. But it appears 
that under Chairman Genachowski’s proposal customers will not be allowed to choose.  They 
will get a one-size-fits-all government-designed business plan whether they want it or not.  
With all due respect, this should not be an FCC decision; this decision should be left to 
customers, and it is the FCC’s job to ensure customers are enabled to make this decision, not to 
make the decision for them. 
Which Business Models Promote Innovation? 
The choice here is between the more “do-it-yourself” model of Google/Android and the more 
managed model of iPhone and Blackberry; between the more open Sprint and more managed 
Verizon Wireless.  And the answer is crystal clear: both models promote innovation.  In the 
device segment, iPhone was the pioneer and Google/Android a fast follower.  Both are 
innovators but we must give the nod to the iPhone for being first and showing the way.  
Blackberry has had a strong position in the business market, but has moved strongly into the 
consumer market with its Storm and Tour models, showing impressive innovation in doing so.  
Its model is more traditional; not as open as Android and not as proprietary as Apple’s.  Sprint 
has been more open in accepting devices and applications that it doesn’t sell, and it has shown 
substantial innovation by being the first to deploy WiMAX (claiming it is 4G).  Verizon 
Wireless has been more managed, only recently accepting phones it does not sell and setting 
up a developer’s website.  It also has shown substantial innovation in early deployment of 3G 
and it will likely be the first to deploy LTE 4G.  But the point is clear; innovation is 
forthcoming from a variety of business models.  There is no need for the FCC to choose the 
better business model, nor is there a need for FCC “guidance” in favoring one business model 
over another.  The FCC’s imposition of open platform restrictions30 in the recent 700 Mhz C-
block auction is an egregious example of unnecessary meddling.  But having established the C 
Block restrictions and committed to the “experiment” in their operation, it plainly makes no 
sense at all to expand those restrictions to other spectrum before the experiment even begins. If 
customers want more open platforms, then there will be a wireless carrier that will provide 
service that meets their needs and gain a competitive advantage over its rivals.  There is no 
market failure here; if the FCC wants to mandate business models and impose costs and 
eliminate customer choices the FCC should not cloak it in the language of efficiency and 
innovation.  
Transparency 
We are very pleased that Chairman Genachowski featured transparency so prominently in his 
September 21, 2009 speech.  We are entirely supportive of vigorous action to ensure 
transparency, preferably in concert with the FTC.  We are disappointed that the Chairman -28- 
 
seemed to think transparency ought only to apply to carriers.  We believe transparency should 
apply to all segments of the wireless ecosystem: applications, devices and carriers.   
We have argued strongly that the FCC must take a customer-centric view of its role, by which 
we mean the FCC needs to support the existing competitive marketplace in all wireless 
segments and refrain from damaging interventions that raise costs and reduce customer 
choice.  But in order for competitive markets to fully realize their potential to empower 
customers, those customers need to have the information they need to make informed 
purchase decisions.  That information can only come from sellers: application providers, 
device manufacturers and core network providers.  If this information is lacking, we do indeed 
face an information symmetry market failure.  The role of information in markets was starkly 
presented in Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper, in which he demonstrated that a market can 
actually collapse in the absence of information.31 
This type of market failure is recognized in virtually all markets, and public policy 
intervention to correct it is well-established.  A fundamental mission of the Federal Trade 
Commission is to ensure that firms disclose decision-relevant information to customers in an 
easy-to-understand format.  In Faulhaber (2009b) several examples of successful disclosure 
mechanisms are discussed in terms of ease of use, convenience to customers and relevant 
information, all of which the FTC developed (in collaboration with the FDA), including both 
food and prescription drug labeling.  Not all of these mechanisms are good fits for other 
industries or situations and none of them may be the right fit for wireless, but it behooves the 
entire industry to avoid the pitfalls such as the dreaded End User License Agreements 
(EULAs) that accompany boxed software, which seem designed to baffle anyone without a J.D. 
If competition is to ensure a customer-centric environment in the wireless ecosystem, 
transparency is an absolute necessity.32  Overall, the wireless industry has done a reasonably 
creditable job at providing customers with the information they need, but there is room for 
improvement.  Although complete precision is plainly impractical in such a rapidly evolving 
marketplace, customers need to know what types of applications are permitted, what types of 
network management practices are in place, and what range of performance they can typically 
expect.  These are complicated technical issues which must be suitably simplified for easy 
presentation to customers.  But surely describing a carrier’s (or device’s) characteristics is no 
more complicated than describing the benefits and risks of taking a prescription drug, and we 
seem to manage that task fairly well.  And if the FCC is to adopt a customer-centric policy of 
letting the competitive market do its thing, then the FCC must ensure that these markets are 
fully transparent.  We note that the Federal Trade Commission is the agency with the most 
experience in the area of transparency and disclosure, and we suggest the FCC partner with 
the FTC and industry to develop standards on transparency and disclosure. 
Conclusion 
All three segments of the wireless marketplace (applications, devices and core networks) have 
extraordinary track records in innovation.  This extraordinary innovation has been driven by -29- 
 
the brutal competition that characterizes this industry.  There are no classic market failures in 
this industry that require regulatory intervention; calls for such interventions by pundits, 
advocates and special interest groups (some reflected in the NOI) are attempts to harness the 
regulatory power of the government to impose their personal agenda on customers.  Our 
position is crystal clear: let customers decide what they want and need.  In order to implement 
this customer-centric policy, the FCC must undertake the following: 
  Put much more spectrum at auction for licensed use.  While we have made suggestions 
as to how much bandwidth is needed (1 Ghz) and where it might come from, it is really 
the FCC’s job to find it and figure out how to clear the bands.  It alone has the 
knowledge and ability to do this. 
  Ensure that all segments of this industry practice good disclosure practices with their 
customers, as outlined in Faulhaber (2009b).  We suggest the FCC partner with the FTC 
in this endeavor, as the FTC has far more experience (and successful experience) than 
does the FCC. 
We conclude by stating that innovation will best thrive with a customer-centric FCC policy of 
ensuring that competitive markets continue to flourish, spectrum is made available and 
transparency is assured.  Regulatory interventions into markets without rigorous justification 
can only raise costs, reduce customer choice, reduce incentives for investment and reduce 
incentives for innovation.  In the absence of market failure, we see no reason for the FCC to 
now adopt a “bull in the china shop” strategy of dictating firms’ business models and 
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-- Endnotes -- 
                                                 
1 Most prominent is Tim Wu (2007) who noted a number of problems with openness (and lack thereof) in the 
wireless industry.  In the event, many of his examples of non-openness were either isolated examples at the time 
(absence of WiFi on certain phones) or have long since been eliminated by innovation and customer demand (lack 
of open application development). 
2 The economics literature on well-meaning regulations causing substantial harm is extensive.  We note 
particularly Carlton and Perloff (2005) and Noll (1989). 
3 In earlier work (2003), the authors suggested the use of “non-interfering easements” as a means of encouraging 
more efficient use of spectrum.  In later work, Faulhaber (2005, 2008) raised doubts about how “non-interfering” 
such uses would be in practice. 
4 For a synopsis of mobile communications worldwide, see Faulhaber (2010), among many others. 
5 Generally, each device vendor or carrier screens applications to verify that they will work as claimed on their 
system.  The Android app store allegedly accepts applications without screening, in the interest of openness.  Of 
course, independent app stores cannot verify their products work on particular devices or carrier networks.  This 
topic is discussed further under Business Models. 
6 A quick scan of AT&T Wireless’ website shows 33 models for sale (not including refurbished phones and non-
phone devices).  A scan of Verizon Wireless’ website shows 40 phones, 10 smartphones and 8 Blackberry devices; 
websites visited Sept 18, 2009. 
7 AT&T Laboratories is a leader in wireless innovation as well as the standard-setting process in the US.  It is a 
successor to Bell Telephone Laboratories, of which both authors are alumni. 
8 System spectral efficiency differs from link spectral efficiency, in that it takes into account real-world factors that 
affect the capacity that can be obtained in real-world applications.  See Wikipedia (2009a). 
9 Apologies to Mac and Linux customers; some applications are developed for both platforms, but the dominance 
of the Windows OS makes it the must-have platform of choice for many developers. 
10 By way of example, some wireless network systems can detect when the “noise floor” (the amount of ambient 
radio noise affecting transmission quality between device and cell tower) raises or lowers, and ask devices to 
adjust their power level of sending and receiving to make maximum use of spectrum as the noise floor fluctuates. 
11 The complexity/simplicity dichotomy has an interesting and instructive economic analogy.  Suppose two firms 
are to transact business.   In the first instance, suppose the transaction is simple; for example, buying copier paper.  
There are well-established standards for copier paper, the purchasing firm can simply specify the standard and 
check the standard is met upon delivery.  In the second instance, suppose the transaction is more complex; for 
example, the purchasing firm wishes the supplier to provide research and development for a common project.  
There is no standard, and execution of the transaction depends upon the supplier operating in good faith and in 
close cooperation with the staff of the purchasing firm.  Simple contracts are no long possible and some form of 
long-term relationship usually characterizes such transactions, with elements of trust and common purpose that 
are not present in the purchase of copier paper.  As in the case of the Internet/PC ecosystem (simple interfaces) 
vs. the wireless ecosystem (complex interfaces), the difference in collaborative innovation is marked. 
12 Using patents as a measure of innovation has its pitfalls: increasingly, patents are applied for as defensive 
measures by innovative companies, and so-called “submarine” patents are a favorite tool by which persons can -35- 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
threaten firms that offer innovative products with patent infringement suits.  Despite its faults, it is likely the best 
direct measure of innovative activity available. 
13 Regional/national carriers typically do marketing and pricing at a regional/national level, although 
competition at the local level in the form of promotions is quite active. 
14 See Wikipedia (2009b) for a definition of HHI and its use in competition analysis. 
15 Simple concentration measures such as HHI are in no way dispositive of the state of competition, as discussed 
in Katz (2009).  Indeed, in antitrust analysis at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, HHI 
is simply an initial screening measure to determine if further analysis is warranted.  No antitrust finding ever 
rests upon the HHI index of an industry. 
16 We are mindful that international comparisons can be misused and are at best indicative.  We believe the Bank 
of America/Merrill Lynch work is as reliable and unbiased as any available. 
17 Static efficiency is sometimes referred to as Marshallian, after Alfred Marshall, a founder of modern economic 
analysis.  Dynamic efficiency is referred to as Schumpeterian, after Joseph Schumpeter, a pioneer in identifying 
the role of innovation in economic growth. 
18 A personal anecdote illustrates the point: the TV show “La Femme Nikita” debuted in 1999 and was the most 
popular cable show for several years.  The heroine worked for an antiterrorist organization which was kitted out 
with very high-tech gear: holographic projectors, fancy computers and servers,…and cell phones.  Viewing the 
show a decade later, one is impressed that everything still looks very high tech…except the cell phones.  The 
show’s producers used Motorola StarTac phones, the hottest phone of 1999; today the StarTac phone seems like 
the mobile equivalent of a steam locomotive: quaintly old-fashioned.  The cell phone is the one technology whose 
rapid advance is obvious even to a TV viewer. 
19 This is not the only study to show that spectrum is underutilized; several studies are mentioned in Faulhaber 
(2005) fn 5.  The conclusion in that work was not to force sharing on licensees but rather to establish property 
rights in spectrum so current licensees that are underutilizing their spectrum would have incentives, through sale 
or sharing, to capitalize on their asset. 
20 See for example, Eric Peterson (2009), Executive Director of the Rural Cellular Association. 
21 This is not to say that spectrum in general is not underutilized.  The authors have argued strongly (Faulhaber 
and Farber (2003)) that spectrum is generally woefully underutilized and have advocated market measures to 
improve utilization.  But certain bands are quite heavily utilized, such as the CMRS bands and the 2.4Ghz WiFi 
bands. 
22 The FCC does not set a schedule for conducting auctions, and often years go by before spectrum becomes 
available.  Carriers are forced to buy spectrum for future use of uncertain duration, as they have no idea when 
more spectrum will become available.  In this uncertain regime, where the FCC creates an artificial scarcity of 
uncertain duration, carriers must maintain a buffer of licensed spectrum in order to ensure future capacity 
demands can be met. 
23 Many pundits and commentators champion unlicensed spectrum as a means of ensuring our wireless 
communication needs.  Certainly the FCC has moved much more spectrum into unlicensed than licensed in the 
past few years.  Faulhaber (2009a) addressed unlicensed vs. licensed as a means to meet our wireless broadband 
needs and concludes, based on the evidence, that unlicensed spectrum is a “regulatory cul-de-sac.”  I need not 
repeat the arguments here.  The short version is that the FCC has allocated two U-NII bands (unlicensed) -36- 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
specifically for wireless broadband, with a total bandwidth of approximately 555 Mhz and to date, almost none of 
it is being used to provide wireless broadband.  None. 
24 This estimate was derived by Jackson & Robyn (2007); the range of bandwidth available depends upon the 
stringency of interference rules, with more stringent rules associated with lower capacity.  It is important to note 
that this is an average over all metro areas in the US; in some areas, there may be no available white space under 
strict interference rules. 
25 Their proposal is often referred to as the “Big Bang Auction”. 
26 The assumption in Faulhaber (2005) is that interference problems would be handled under trespass laws, not 
nuisance laws.  The example used in this paper of lengthy and litigious regulatory procedures was the 800 Mhz 
Nextel dispute.  Apparently, the FCC handled this case on an expedited basis and yet it took almost two years to 
resolve. 
27 We recognize that this assertion depends upon technical restrictions of a spectrum license that are both clear 
and measurable so that a lay judge and jury can determine whether or not a property right has been transgressed. 
28 For example, the iPhone is only available on AT&T Wireless while Blackberry phones are available from 
numerous carriers. 
29 Sidak (2006) discusses the costs imposed by mandating network neutrality, including increased transaction 
costs, administrative costs and opportunity costs.   
30 In the recent 700 Mhz auction, the FCC required the winner of the C block spectrum to permit customers to use 
any device and any application on service offered using that spectrum (PC Magazine (2007)). 
31 In the Akerlof example, the market collapses because each seller (of a low-quality auto, or “lemon”) has an 
incentive to misrepresent the quality of his or her automobile, and customers cannot distinguish the good from 
the bad.  Any method, private or public, that results in a credible signal of quality from the seller corrects the 
market failure, restores the market, and is preferred by customers and sellers of high-quality autos (but not the 
sellers of “lemons”).  
32 Faulhaber (2009a, 2009b) makes this point in the context of the broadband industry (both wired and wireless); it 
is equally valid here.   September, 2009 
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Internet: Selected Papers from the 1996 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, ed. 
Greg Rosston and David Waterman, Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Mahwah, NJ, 1997. 
“Markets vs. Governments: The Political Economy of NIMBY,” (with D. Ingberman), in 
Roger D. Congleton, ed., The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and 
Evidence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995 
“Pricing Internet: The Efficient Subsidy,” in B. Kahin, ed., Building Information 
Infrastructure, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. 
“The Impact of Divestiture on AT&T,“ in J. Federowicz, ed., From Monopoly to 
Competition: Telecommunications in Transition, Mississauga, Ontario: Informatics 
Publishing, 1991.   September, 2009 
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“Quality Control in the Service Firm and Consumer Learning,“ (with F. Allen), in 
Brown, Gummesson, Edvardsson, and Gustavsson, eds. Service Quality, Lexington , MA: 
Lexington Books, 1991. 
“Telecommunications and the Scope of the Market in Services,“ in H. Giersch, ed. 
Services in World Economic Growth, Teubingen, Germany: Mohr Publishing Co., 1989. 
“Payment Risk, Network Risk and the Role of the Fed,“ (with A. Santomero and A. 
Phillips), in D. Humphrey, ed., The U.S. Payments System: Efficiency, Risk, and the Role of 
the Federal Reserve, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. 
 “Financial Services: Markets in Transition“ (“I Servizi Finanziari: Un Mercato in 
Evoluzione“), in G. Tamburini, ed., Verso L’Economia dei Nuovi Servizi: Il Settore 
Finanziario, Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1988.  
“Deregulation and Innovation in Telecommunications,“ in G. Libecap, ed., Advances in 
the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth Vol. 2, New York: JAI 
Press, 1988.  
“A Public Enterprise Pricing Primer,“ in J. Finsinger, ed., Economic Analysis of Regulated 
Markets, Lexington, 1982.  
“Cross-Subsidization in Public Enterprise Pricing,“ in J.T. Wenders, ed., Pricing in 
Regulated Industries, Theory and Application II, Denver, 1979.  
“Peak-Load Pricing and Regulatory Accountability,“ in M.A. Crew, ed., Problems in 
Public Utility Economics and Regulation, Lexington, MA, 1979.  
“Design of Priority Reservation Systems,“ Proceedings of the Fifth International Teletraffic 
Congress, June, 1967.  
Books: 
European Economic Integration: The Role of Technology, editor (with G. Tamburini) Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991 
Telecommunications in Turmoil: Technology and Public Policy, Ballinger Publishing, 1987. 
Services in Transition: The Impact of Information Technology on the Service Sector, editor 
(with E. Noam and R. Tasley). Ballinger, Inc., 1986.  
Telecommunications Access and Public Policy, editor (with A. Baughcum), Ablex, Inc., 1984.  
   September, 2009 
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TALKS AND SEMINARS 
“Mobile Communications: Economic and Social Impact,” presented at Wireless 
Technologies: Enabling Innovation and Growth, Georgetown University Center for 
Business and Public Policy, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2009. 
“China: A World Player,” presented at Wharton China Week, Wharton School, 
Unversity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, March 24, 2009. 
 “Mobile Opportunities for China,” presented at Wharton China Business Forum, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA., February 21, 2009. 
“Broadband – More Is Better?” presented at Congressional Chief of Staff Briefing, 
George Mason University Mercatus Center, Philadelphia, PA., February 20, 2009. 
“Solving the Interoperability Problem: Are We on the Same Channel?” presented at 
Wharton Information Security Best Practices, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA., January 30, 2009. 
“Deploying Cognitive Radio,” presented at Korean Information Society Development 
Institute, Seoul, Korea, November 14, 2008. 
 “Economic and Social Impact of Mobile Telephony,” presented at Broadcasting and 
Telecoms Meet the Digital Convergence, Korean Information Society Development 
Institute, Seoul, Korea, November 13, 2008, 
 “Network Neutrality: Dealing with the NetHeads,” presented at Nominum Global 
Customer Conference, New York City, NY., October 16, 2008. 
 “Are We On the Same Channel?” presented at Public Safety Communications Summit, 
Institute for Defense and Government Advancement, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2008. 
 “Whatever Happened to the Spectrum Debate?” presented at Spectrum Policy: From 
the Foundations to the Future, Georgetown University Center for Business and Public 
Policy, Washington, D.C., April 25, 2008. 
“Internet Video Policy,” presented at Internet Video Policy Symposium, Washington, 
D.C., March 18, 2008. 
“Broadband Deployment and Policy,” presented at the Congressional Briefing, George 
Mason University Mercatus Center, Alexandria, VA., August 21, 2007. 
“Telecommunications Regulatory Reform: Then and Now,” presented at the 34th Annual 
PURC Conference, A Century of Utility Regulation: Looking Forwad to the Next Hundred 
Years, University of Florida, Gainsville, FL, February 16, 2007. 
Panelist, Plenary Session on Network Neutrality and commenter onBenkler, Y., Wealth 
of Networks, at Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, George Mason 
University, Alexandria, VA., September, 2006.   September, 2009 
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“Solving the Interoperability Problem: Are We on the Same Channel?” presented at The 
Crisis in Public Safety Communications, George Mason School of Law, December 8, 
2006. 
Panelist, “Open Source in the International Marketplace,” Roundtable discussion 
sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania Law School Journal of International 
Economic Law, March 31, 2006 
“Life and Death on the Radio: Thoughts on Public Safety,” presented at Penn Law Ad 
Hoc Seminar, December 6, 2005. 
“The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management and Regime Change,” presented 
at the Wharton Colloquium on Media and Communications Law, October 28, 2005.  
Also presented at New Directions in Regulation Seminar, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, October 20, 2005. Also presented at the USC Law 
Center Conference on Wireless Broadband: Is the US Lagging?, Washington, DC, 
October 27, 2005. 
“File Sharing, Copyright, Digital Rights Management, and the Optimal Production of 
Music,” presented at Penn Law’s Ad Hoc Summer Seminar, July 19, 2005, Wharton’s 
Applied Economics Workshop, August 10, 2005, Kennedy School’s New Directions in 
Regulation Seminar, October 20, 2005, and Wharton’s Colloquium on Media Law, 
October 28, 2005.  
Keynote Speaker and Panel Moderator, Conference on Spectrum Policy in Guatemala and 
Latin America, Francisco Marroquín University,Guatemala City, Guatemala,June 9-10, 2005 
“The Question of Spectrum: Issues for the US Congress,” MIT briefing of Congressional 
Staff, March 30, 2005. 
“The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management and Regime Change,” presented 
at Penn Law Ad Hoc Seminar, December 14, 2004.  Also presented at the Silicon 
Flatirons conference “The Digital Broadband Migration:  Rewriting The Telecom Act,” 
University of Colorado Boulder Law School, Feb 12-13, 2005.  Also presented at 
Michigan State University conference on the “Economics, Technology, and Policy of 
Unlicensed Spectrum,” East Lansing, MI, May 15-16, 2005.   
“Spectrum Management: Understanding the Issues,” presented at IWCE Conference on 
Spectrum issues, Las Vegas, NV, March 25, 2004. 
“Researchable Issues in Spectrum Management,” presented at FCC-Academic 
Workshop on Setting the Research Agenda, Federal Communications Commission, 
Washington, DC, December 5, 2003. 
“Wireless Telecoms in Asia,” panel moderator at Wharton Asia Conference, November 
15, 2003. 
“Telecoms in Trouble: Can Policy Help?” presented at PrincetonSymposium on Helping 
Troubled Industries, October 18, 2003.   September, 2009 
- 9 - 
“The Chief Economist: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to be Effective,” presented 
at The Chief Economists Speak Out, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown 
University, October 17, 2003. 
“Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, And The Commons,” with David 
Farber, presented at International Symposium on Advanced Radio Technologies, 
Boulder, CO and University of Colorado Law School Moot Court, Boulder, CO,  March, 
2002.  Also presented at Stanford Law School Conference, “Spectrum Policy: Property 
Rights or Commons?” and Moot Court, March, 2003. 
“Access ¹ Access1 + Access2,”, presented at Rethinking Access, Third Quello Center 
Communications Policy & Law Symposium, March, 2002, Washington, DC  
“Economics at the FCC,” plenary address at the Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, October, 2001. 
“Network Effects and Antitrust: FCC Analysis of the AOL-Time Warner Merger,” 
presented at Georgetown University, March 13, 2001, American Enterprise Institute, 
April 25, 2001; London Business School, May 14, 2001; Wharton Applied Economics 
Workshop, July, 2001; Duke University School of Law, October, 2001, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, October, 2001. 
“Policy-Induced Competition: the Telecommunications Experiments,” presented at 
Wharton Applied Economics Workshop, September, 2001. 
“Broadband Deployment: Is Policy in the Way?” invited paper presented at AEI-
Brookings Regulatory Center Conference on Broadband Deployment, October, 2001. 
“Cross-Platform Competition in Telecommunications,” Aspen Institute 
Telecommunications Workshop, Aspen, CO, August, 2001. 
“FCC Analysis of the AOL-Time Warner Merger,” Wharton Applied Economics 
Workshop, December, 2000. 
“Information, Disinformation and Lobbying,” presented at Institut d’Analisi Economica, 
Barcelona, Spain (October, 1999), Wharton Applied Economics Workshop, February, 
2000. 
“ Lobbying, Voting, and the Political Economy of Price Regulation”; presented at 
INSEAD Business and Economics Seminar, Fontainebleau, France on April 24, 1997, and 
Séminaire Roy, CERAS-ENPC, Paris, France on April 28, 1997; Cornell Economics Dept. 
Econometrics Seminar, September 8, 1997; Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, Alexandria, VA, September 28, 1997; Stanford Economics Department' s 
Economics & Political Science Seminar (November 25, 1997); the Applied Economics 
Seminar at Wharton (October 15, 1997); Political Science Dept, UC Berkeley, Public 
Policy Seminar (May 4, 1998), Tsinghua University (Beijing) (April, 1999)., Institut 
d’Analisi Economica, Barcelona, Spain (October, 1999).   September, 2009 
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“The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications: Is Regulation Necessary? “, 
(joint work with Christiaan Hogendorn),  presented at the symposium "Bridging Digital 
Technologies And Regulatory Paradigms," UC Berkeley, June 27-28, 1997; 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, September 29, 1997; 
Wharton Public Policy & Management Brown Bag Seminar (October 16, 1997); Wharton  
Marketing Department' s Electronic Commerce Seminar (December 3, 1997) Tsinghua 
University (Beijing) (April, 1999). 
“Voting on Prices: The Political Economy of Regulation,” presented at the Wharton 
School PP&M Brown Bag Seminar, Nov., 1995; Department of Economics, Universidad 
Carlos III, Madrid, Spain, April, 1996; the Public Utility Workshop sponsored by 
Rutgers Center for Regulated Industries; the University of Warwick (UK) Industrial 
Organization Workshop; the Business & Public Policy Seminar at the Haas School, UC 
Berkeley; the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference; and INSEAD' s Business 
and Economics Seminar, Fontainebleau, France 
“The Networked Future: Market Outcomes and Policy Options,” presented at Aula 
Fundesco, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain, April, 1996. 
“Banking Markets: Productivity, Risk, and Customer Satisfaction,” presented at (i) 
Wharton Financial Institutions Seminar, April, 1995; (ii) Institut d' analisi Economica, 
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, July, 1995, and Wharton Applied Economics 
Workshop, January, 1996. 
“Pricing the Net: Economists’ Contributions,” presented at Stanford University 
Conference on Data Network Pricing, March, 1995. 
“The Information Superhighway: Public Policy Issues,” presented at Wharton School 
PP&M Brown Bag Seminar, November, 1994. 
“Bank Efficiency: A Profitability Modeling Approach,” presented at Wharton School 
Financial Institutions Center Seminar, October, 1993. 
“Profitability and Bank Size: An Empirical Analysis,” presented at Wharton School 
PP&M Brown Bag Seminar, November, 1992. 
“Pricing Internet: The Efficient Subsidy,“ presented at “Information Infrastructure for 
the 1990s“ Symposium, Harvard University, November, 1990. 
“Unbalanced Growth Redux: Sectoral Productivity and Capital Markets,“ (with F. Allen 
and C. MacKinlay) presented at AEA Winter Meeting, New York, NY, December 1988. 
“Quality Control in the Service Firm and Consumer Learning,“ presented at the 
Symposium on Quality in Services, Karlstad, Sweden, August 1988. 
“Telecommunications and the Scope of the Market in Services,“ presented at the 
Conference on Services and World Economic Growth, Kiel, Germany, June 1988, and the 
Conference on Innovation in Europe 1992, Spoleto, Italy, July 1988.     September, 2009 
- 11 - 
“Payment Risk, Network Risk and the Role of the Fed,“ (with A. Santomero and A. 
Phillips), presented at the Richmond Federal Reserve Bank’s Payment System 
Symposium, Williamsburg, VA, May, 1988.  
“The Changing Role of R&D in Telecommunications,“ presented at VISIO ’88, Helsinki, 
Finland, March, 1988.  
“Rational Rationing,“ presented at University of Pennsylvania Transactions Cost 
Workshop, November, 1987, and the Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, 
April, 1988. 
“Financial Services: Markets in Transition,“ presented at Conference on the Service 
Economy, Spoleto, Italy, July, 1987, and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences World 
Economics Institute, July, 1987.  
“The American Experience with Service Sector Deregulation,“ presented at the 
Hungarian Academy of Science World Economics Institute, July, 1987.  
“Optimism Invites Deception,“ (with F. Allen) presented at Stanford University and the 
University of California, Berkeley, workshops, and American Economic Association 
Meetings (contributed  paper), New Orleans, December, 1986.  
“Reputation, ’Fly-by-Night’ Firms, and the Market for Product Reviews,“ (with D. A. 
Yao) presented at University of Pennsylvania Transactions Cost Workshop, April, 1985, 
European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, Berlin, August, 1986.  
“The Market for Product Reviews: Who Pays?“ (with D. A. Yao) presented at American 
Economic Association meetings (contributed paper), New Orleans, December, 1986.  
“Communications, Information and Economic Growth,“ presented at the Conference on 
Technological Development:  Causes and Consequences, United States and West 
Germany, Bonn, November, 1984. 
 “Pricing In the Twilight of Regulation,“ presented at the Twelfth Annual 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Airlie, Virginia, April, 1984.  
“Cross-Subsidy Control:  In General, and in Telecommunications,“ presented at 
American Economic Association meetings, New York, December 1982.  
“Public Policy, Corporate Strategy, and Telecommunications Restructure,“ presented at 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Conference, Minneapolis, MN, 
October 1982.  
“A Public Enterprise Pricing Primer,“ presented at International Institute of 
Management Regulation Conference, Berlin, July, 1981. 
“Separate Subsidiaries, Cross-Subsidy Control, and the Restructure of 
Telecommunications” Panel presentation at Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, Annapolis, May, 1981.    September, 2009 
- 12 - 
“Subsidy-Free Prices and Anonymous Equity,“ presented at (a) U.C. Berkeley Ind. Org. 
Seminar, March, 1981, (b) U.C. San Diego Theory Seminar, March, 1981, (c) Princeton 
University Econometric Seminar, April, 1981, (d) NYU Theory Seminar, November 1980, 
and (e) American Economic Association meetings, Denver, September, 1980.  
“Cross-Subsidy in Increasing Returns Industries,“ presented at Federal Trade 
Commission, September, 1980.  
“Market Structure and Competitive Outcomes in Telecommunications,“ presented at 
WEA Conference, June 1980 and Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Annapolis, May, 1980.  
“Regulation and Market Structure in Telecommunications“ (with J.H. Rohlfs), presented 
at Conference on Economics of Telecommunications:  Current Research on Demand, 
Pricing, and Regulation, Northwestern University, January 1980; and Conference on 
Utility Regulation and Management for the 1980’s, University of Florida, January, 1980 .  
“Telecommunications:  A Structural View,“ Princeton University.  Industrial 
Organization Workshop, May, 1979.  
“A Perspective on Telecommunications Industry Restructure“ in Proceedings of the 
1979 Rate Symposium on Problems of Regulated Industries.  
“Peak Load Pricing and Regulatory Accountability,“ presented at Rutgers University 
Conference on Public Utility Regulation and Performance, October 1978 .  
“Cross-Subsidy and Public Enterprise Pricing,“ presented at Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference, May, 1978.  
“Pareto Efficiency, Increasing Returns, and Partial Information,“ presented at the 
University of California Berkeley Industrial Organization Seminar and at Stanford 
University Industrial Organization Seminar, October 1977, and WEA Conference, June 
1978. 
“Optimal Two-Part Tariffs with Self Selection,“ presented at Telecommunication Policy 
Research Conference, April 1977, and WEA Conference, June, 1976, and Bell 
Laboratories Economic Discussion Paper #74, January, 1977 (with J.C. Panzar). 
“Competitive Entry and Natural Monopoly,“ presented at Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference, April, 1976.  
“Optimality and Equilibrium with Increasing Returns to Scale,“ presented at NSF-NBER 
Seminar on Decentralization.  Princeton University, April 1975, and 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, April, 1975.  
“Some Tentative Thoughts on Cross-Subsidization,“ presented at White House 
Conference on Telecommunications, Washington, November, 1972.    September, 2009 
- 13 - 
“The Pricing of Warrants,“ presented at Princeton University Industrial Organization 
Seminar and Cornell University Operations Research Department, November, 1971. 
“The Design of Priority Reservation System,“ presented at IEEE Conference, 
Philadelphia, January, 1968 and International Teletraffic Congress, New York, June, 
1967. 
 
PREVIOUS TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Visiting Professor, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School, 1993, Regulatory 
Economics 
Visiting Professor, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, spring 1999, Technology for 
Managers (International MBA program). 
Research Associate Professor, New York University, 1979-1983, Industry Regulation 
(Graduate).  




Institut d’Analisi Economica, Barcelona, Spain, fall, 1999.  Information, Disinformation 
and Lobbying. 
Annenberg School summer 1996.  The Networked Future: Market Outcomes and Public 
Policy Options . 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Summer 1994.  Empirical Analysis of the Impact 
of Customer Satisfaction on Bank Profitability. 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Summer 1993.  Empirical Analysis of Theoretical 
Model of Bank Efficiencies. 
 
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES: 
National Research Council Committee on the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data, 1995-
96. 
Editor Board member, Journal of Industrial Economics.  
Associate Editor, Information and Economic Policy   September, 2009 
- 14 - 
Referee for American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Industrial Economics, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, Information and Economic Policy, Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, and Journal of Political Economy. 
Reviewer of National Science Foundation Grant Proposals.  
Member of Advisory Board, Columbia University Information and Telecommunications 
Institute (CITI). 
Chairman of Organizing Committee, 1988 Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference.  
Governor’s Task Force on Economic Development: Service Sector Task Force, 1987. 
Served on original Organizing Committee for Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, 1973-1974.  
Served on Organizing Committee for Workshop on Local Access, held in St. Louis, MO, 
September, 1982.  
 
 





Distinguished Career Professor of Computer Science and Public Policy at Carnegie 
Mellon University (2002-present) 
 
The Alfred Fitler Moore Professor of Telecommunication Systems, Moore School, and 
Professor of Public Policy, Wharton School University of Pennsylvania (1988 – 2003-
retired) 
 
Chief Technologist, Federal Communications Commission (1999-2000) 
 
Director of the Distributed Systems Laboratory, University of Pennsylvania (1988 - 
present) 
 
Director of the Center for Networking Technology and Applications, University of 
Delaware (1987 - 1988) 
 
Professor of Electrical Engineering and Professor of Computer Science, University of 
Delaware (1977 - 1988) 
 
Associate Professor of Information and Computer Sciences and of Electrical Engineering 
(with Tenure), University of California at Irvine (1970 - 1977) 
 
Founder and Vice President of Research and Planning for Caine, Farber and Gordon Inc. 
(1970 -) 
 
Principal Member of the Technical Staff, Xerox Data Systems (1969 - 1970) 
 
Member of the Technical Staff, the RAND Corporation (1967 - 1969) 
 
Supervisor; Systems Programming Department, Bell Telephone Laboratories (1965 - 
1966) 
 
Member of the Technical Staff, Programming Research Department, Bell Telephone 
Laboratories (1962 - 1965) 
 
Member of the Technical Staff, Electronic Switching Engineering Systems Department, 




Stevens Institute of Technology Doctor of Sciences (honorary) 1999 
 
University of Pennsylvania MA (honorary), 1988 
 
Stevens Institute of Technology BSEE, 1956 
 
Stevens Institute of Technology, MS in Math, 1962 
 
Bell Telephone Laboratories Communication Development Program, 1963 (Equivalent to 





RECENT HONORARY APPOINTMENTS and AWARDS 
 
Fellow of the IEEE  
 
Fellow of the ACM 
 
Appointed as a Commissioner to the Mayor’s Telecommunications Policy Advisory 
Committee of Philadelphia 
 
Trustee of the Stevens Institute of Technology  
 
Trustee of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
 
Elected Trustee of the Internet Society (two full terms) 
 
Recipient of the SIGCOMM Award for Lifetime Contributions to the field 
 
Recipient of the John Scott Award for Contributions to Humanity for work in 
Networking 
 
Visiting Professor of the Glocom Institute of Japan, International University of Japan 
 
Advisory Board at the National Institute of Informatics of Japan 
 





Patent No. 6,072,780, 6,266,328, 6,480,474 initially filed August 26, 1996, “Telephone call-back system 
controlled by online data network in real time,” D. Farber et al. 
 
Patent No. 5,329,623 awarded July 12, 1994, “Apparatus for  Providing  Cryptographic  
Support in a Network,”  Jonathan M. Smith, C. Brendan S. Traw, and David J.  Farber. 
 
Patent No. 5,353,419 awarded October 4, 1994, “An Active Instruction Decoding 
Processor-Memory Interface,” J. Touch and D. Farber. 
 
Patent No. 6,185,678 awarded February 6, 2001, “Secure and Reliable Bootstrap Architecture,” William A. 
Arbaugh, David J. Farber, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Jonathan M. Smith.  
 
  




The Office of the Future: Communication and Computers, R.P. Uhlig, D.J. Farber and 




The Markle Foundation Task Force report on National Security in the Information Age 
 
Realizing the Information Future, National Research Council 
 




Transport Protocols for Department of Defense Data Networks, National Research 
Council 
 
Report on the Evolution of a National Supercomputer Access Network - Sciencenet, 




SNOBOL, A String Manipulation Language, Co-authored with R.E. Griswold and I.P. 
Polonsky, Journal of the ACM, 1964. 
 
SNOBOL 3, Co-authored with R.E. Griswold and I.P. Polonsky, Bell System Technical 
Journal, 1966. 
 
APAREL - A Parse Request Language, Co-authored with R. Balzer, Communications of 
the ACM, 1969. 
 
Software Considerations in Distributed Architectures, D.J. Farber, IEEE Computer 
Magazine, vol. 7, pp.31-35, 1974. 
 
A Parallel Mechanism for Detecting Curves in Pictures, P.M. Merlin * and D.J. Farber, 
IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol.24, pp.96-98, 1975. 
 
Recoverability of Communication Protocols - Implications of a Theoretical Study, P.M. 
Merlin * and D.J. Farber, IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol.24, pp. 1036-
1043, 1976 
 
The Overseer, a Powerful Communications Attribute for Debugging and Security in 
Thin-Wire Connected Control Structures, David J. Farber, J. B. Pickens,* ICCC 1976: 
441-451 
 
On the Design of Local Network Interfaces, Paul V. Mockapetris*, Michael Lyle*, 
David J. Farber, IFIP Congress 1977: 427-430 
 
The Convergence of Computing and Telecommunications Systems, D.J. Farber and P. 
Baran, Science, Special issue on Electronics, vol. 195, pp.1166-1170, 1977. Invited 
Article. (Also published in #5 of the AAAS Science Compendia, 1978.) 
 
SODS/OS: Distributed Operating System for the IBM Series/1, W. David Sincoskie*, 
David J. Farber Operating Systems Review 14(3): 46-54 (1980 
 
The National Research Network, D.Jennings, L. Landweber, I. Fuchs, R. Adrion, D. 
Farber, Science Feb 28, 1986. Invited article. 
 
NOAH NET, An Experimental Flood Local Area Network, David J. Farber, Guru M. 
Parulkar,* ICCC 1986: 265-269 
 
Design and Implementation of a Trusted Mail Agent, Marshall T. Rose, David J. Farber, 
Stephen T. Walker, ICCC 1986: 103-107 
 
The World of Computer Networking in the 1990’s, International Congress of Radio 
Sciences, Israel 1987 
 
Performance models for Noahnet, Guru M. Parulkar*, Adarshpal S. Sethi, David J. 




An analysis of Memnet - an experiment in high-speed shared-memory local networking, 
Gary S. Delp*, Adarshpal S. Sethi, David J. Farber, SIGCOMM 1988: 165-174 
 
A Taxonomy-Based Comparison of Several Distributed Shared Memory Systems, Ming-
Chit Tam*, Jonathan  M. Smith, David J. Farber, Operating Systems Review 24(3): 40-
67 (1990) 
 
Traffic Characteristics of a Distributed Memory System, Jonathan M. Smith, David J. 
Farber, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 22(2): 143-154 (1991) 
 
Memory as a Network  Abstraction, Gary  Delp*, David Farber, Ronald Minnich*, 
Jonathan M. Smith, and Ming-Chit Tam*, IEEE Network, Vol. 5(4), pp. 34-41 (July, 
1991). 
 
An Overview of the AURORA Gigabit Testbed, David D. Clark, David L. Tennenhouse, 
David J. Farber, Jonathan M. Smith, Bruce S. Davie, W. David Sincoskie, Inder S. 
Gopal, Bharath K. Kadaba, INFOCOM 1992: 569-581 1991 
 
The AURORA Gigabit Testbed, David D. Clark, Bruce S. Davie, David J. Farber, Inder 
S. Gopal, Bharath K. Kadaba, W. David Sincoskie, Jonathan M. Smith, David L. 
Tennenhouse, 1992 Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 25(6): 599-621 (1993) 
 
An Experiment in Latency Reduction, Joseph D. Touch*, David J. Farber, INFOCOM 
1994: 175-181 
 
Gigabit Telerobotics: Applying Advanced Information Infrastructure, Ruzena  Bajcsy,  
David  J. Farber,  Richard  P.  Paul,  and  Jonathan M. Smith, in 1994 International 
Symposium On Robotics and Manufacturing, Maui, HI (August 1994). 
 
A new congestion control framework for large bandwidth-delay product networks, 
Hyogon Kim*, David J.   Farber HPN 1995: 294-304 
 
State Caching in the EROS Kernel. Jonathan S. Shapiro*, David J. Farber, Jonathan M. 
Smith, POS 1996: 88-100 1995 
 
The  Measured Performance of a Fast Local IPC, Jonathan S. Shapiro, David J. Farber, 
and Jonathan M. Smith, in Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Object 
Orientation in Operating  Systems, Seattle, WA (November  1996) 
 
Communications Technology and its Impact by 2010, David J. Farber (Invited) CACM 
40(2): 135-138 (1997) 
 
Security for Virtual Private Intranets. William A. Arbaugh*, James R. Davin*, David J. 
Farber, IEEE Computer 31(9): 48-55 (1998) 
 
EROS: A Fast Capability System, Jonathan S. Shapiro*, Jonathan M. Smith, David J. 
Farber SOSP 1999: 170-185 
 
Predicting the unpredictable: Future directions in internetworking and their implications, 
David J. Farber IEEE Communications Magazine, no. 7, Jul 2002 
 
Balancing Security and Liberty, David J. Farber (Invited) IEEE Internet Computing 5(6): 
96 (2001) 
 
Fame, but No Riches, For Cybersecurity -- It’s time for government and industry to put 
their money where their mouths are, David J. Farber (invited) IEEE Spectrum, Jan. 2003  
 
 
Conference And Other Papers  
 
Farber, D.J., “A Survey of Computer Networks,” Datamation 18, 4 (April 1972), 36-39. 
 
Farber, D.J. and F.R. Heinrich, “The Structure of a Distributed Computer System -- The 
Distributed File System,”  Proc. International Conference on Computer Communications, 
(Oct. 1972), 364-370. 
 
Farber, D.J., M.D. Hopwood, and L.A. Rowe, “Fail-Soft Behavior of the Distributed 
Computer System,” Technical Report #24, Department of Information and Computer 
Science, University of California, Irvine, California, (November 1972). 
 
Farber, D.J. and K. Larson, “The Structure of a Distributed Computer System -- The 
Communications System,” Proc. Symposium on Computer-Communications Networks 
and Teletraffic, Microwave Research Institute of Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn (April 
1972). 
 
Loomis, D.C., Ring Communication Protocols, UC Irvine Distributed Computer Project, 
Memo 46-A (May 1972). 
 
Farber, D.J., J. Feldman, F.R. Heinrich, M.D. Hopwood, K.C. Larson, D.C. Loomis, and 
L.A. Rowe. “The Distributed Computing System,” Proc. Seventh Annual IEEE 
Computer Society International Conference, (Feb. 1973), pp. 31-34. 
 
Rowe, L.A., M.D. Hopwood, and D.J. Farber, “Software Methods for Achieving Fail-
Soft Behavior in the Distributed Computing System,” 1973 IEEE Symposium on 
Computer Software Reliability, (April 30, May 1-2, 1973), pp. 7-11. 
 
Mockatetris, P., Lyle, M. and Farber, D., “On the Design of Local Network Interfaces,” 
IFIPS 1977 
 
Sincoskie, W. and Farber, D., “The Series/1 Distributed Operating System,” Local 
Networks Conference 1981 
 
Farber, D., “An Overview of Distributed Processing Aims,” 1974 COMPCON. 
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